Då har du trampat in i solipsismen, vilket naturligtvis för med sig sina egna problem.
Men det är fint, ändå, att forumet upprätthåller en tradition med uråldriga anor. Russel sammanfattar problematiken väl i "History of western philosophy när han avhandlar atomisterna:
The atomists, unlike Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, sought to explain the
world without introducing the notion of purpose or final cause. The ‘final cause’
of an occurrence is an event in the future for the sake of which the occurrence
takes place. In human affairs, this conception is applicable. Why does
the baker make bread? Because people will be hungry. Why are railways
built? Because people will wish to travel. In such cases, things are explained
by the purpose they serve. When we ask ‘why?’ concerning an event, we may
mean either of two things. We may mean: ‘What purpose did this event
serve?’ or we may mean: ‘What earlier circumstances caused this event?’ The
answer to the former question is a teleological explanation, or an explanation
by final causes; the answer to the latter question is a mechanistic explanation.
I do not see how it could have been known in advance which of these two
questions science ought to ask, or whether it ought to ask both. But experience
has shown that the mechanistic question leads to scientific knowledge,
while the teleological question does not. The atomists asked the mechanistic
question,
and gave a mechanistic answer. Their successors, until the Renaissance,
were more interested in the teleological question, and thus led science
up a blind alley.
In regard to both questions alike, there is a limitation which is often
ignored, both in popular thought and in philosophy. Neither question can be
asked intelligibly about reality as a whole (including God), but only about
parts of it. As regards the teleological explanation, it usually arrives, before
long, at a Creator, or at least an Artificer, whose purposes are realized in the
course of nature. But if a man is so obstinately teleological as to continue to
ask what purpose is served by the Creator, it becomes obvious that his question
is impious. It is, moreover, unmeaning, since, to make it significant, we
should have to suppose the Creator created by some super-Creator whose
purposes He served. The conception of purpose, therefore, is only applicable
within reality, not to reality as a whole.
A not dissimilar argument applies to mechanistic explanations. One event
is caused by another, the other by a third, and so on. But if we ask for a cause
of the whole, we are driven again to the Creator, who must Himself be
uncaused. All causal explanations, therefore must have an arbitrary beginning.
That is why it is no defect in the theory of the atomists to have left the
original movements of the atoms unaccounted for.